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Introductioni 
In devoting serious analytic attention to the details of everyday life, Georg 
Simmel (1858-1918) was sociology’s original microscopist. The German 
philosopher became the first great figure in sociology’s classical tradition to 
set out a distinctively interactionist conception of society. He presented an 
alternative to the common view of society as a supra-individual structure 
made up of such major institutions as work, family and kinship, religion, 
political life and the like. Rather, Simmel saw society as fundamentally 
composed of a great multitude of often fleeting, enabling and constraining 
interactions and associations among human beings. For Simmel (1950:11) 
“society certainly is not a ‘substance’, nothing concrete, but an event: it is 
the function of receiving and effecting the fate and development of one 
individual by the other”. Approaching society as an event meant, according 
to Simmel, seeing it as a vast network of people engaged in ordinary 
activities such as eating meals together, bartering goods, exercising 
leadership in a group, exchanging letters, glancing at one another, flirting at 
parties, sitting silently in crowded railway carriages, keeping secrets, giving 
one’s word to do something, mediating between conflicting parties, 
exercising tact and expressing gratitude.  
To that distinctive interactional view of society Simmel brought to bear 
a coherent approach to inquiry: interactions and associations were to be 
analysed in terms of their ‘form’, the term he used to outline the contours 
and characteristics typically assumed by these human social configurations. 
The idea of form derived from Simmel’s philosophical training in the German 
idealist tradition – from beginning to end Simmel self-identified as a 
philosopher – yet there was a significant and influential sociological side to 
his thinking that developed in the 1890s and 1900s. Simmel’s sociological 
project was advanced in 1900 by Philosophie des Geldes and culminated in 
the 1908 publication of Soziologie. This volume presented the fullest 
statement of Simmel’s formal sociology, collecting together studies on which 
he had worked over the previous decade and a half.  
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From the 1890s when his efforts to establish sociology as a special 
social science first attracted widespread attention internationally, to his 
current lionization by those working in cultural theory and cultural studies, 
Simmel never seems to have been out of fashion. There has also been 
acknowledgement, albeit uneven, of his role as a precursor of interactionism 
(Levine et al, 1976). Importantly for his influence on American sociology, 
portions of Simmel’s writings became known in the English-speaking world 
while they were in development. Simmel’s work, unlike that of his now more 
prominent contemporary Max Weber, was translated into English in his own 
lifetime. At the University of Chicago Albion W. Small, in his role as 
founding editor of the American Journal of Sociology, ensured that Simmel’s 
sociological papers reached a wide English-speaking audience in the years 
up to 1910. Through much of the twentieth century a pattern of piecemeal 
translation into English persisted. Thus, English readers had to wait over a 
century to see Soziologie in its entirety, which finally appeared as Sociology: 
Inquiries into the Construction of Social Forms (Simmel 2009).  
As the nineteenth century turned into the twentieth, the contested 
discipline of sociology struggled to legitimate itself within the academy. In 
that struggle Simmel offered both a defined field for sociological inquiry and 
a clear approach. For Simmel, sociology’s distinctive topic matter was to be 
‘Vergesellschaftung’ – usually translated as ‘sociation’, the interactions 
occurring between individualsii. Its approach was to abstract sociation’s 
‘forms’ and elucidate their features. At a pivotal point in the founding of 
sociology, Simmel offered a lucid – if contentious – clarification of the new 
discipline. 
The chapter begins with a sketch of the life of Georg Simmel and then 
proceeds to examine the claim that Simmel was an interactionist before 
symbolic interactionism. It then considers Simmel’s formal sociology in more 
detail in order to establish the relevance of his reasoning for interactionist 
approaches, giving particular attention to Simmel’s analysis of the role of 
knowledge in social life. The chapter continues with an outline of how 
Simmel’s ideas are reflected in the work of two of interactionism’s most 
gifted practitioners, Herbert Blumer (1900-1987) and Erving Goffman (1922-
1982). In conclusion the continuing relevance of Simmel’s sociology for 
interactionist analysis is suggested. 
The Person 
Georg Simmel was born on 1 March 1858 in central Berlin, the 
vibrant, cosmopolitan city in which he lived and worked for all but the last 
four years of his life. His parents converted from Judaism and Simmel 
nominally embraced Protestantism. However, others defined him as a Jew 
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and for much of his life Simmel was a victim of the pervasive anti-Semitism 
present in the German university system of the time. Repeatedly he was 
denied a full-time appointment commensurate with his intellectual stature, 
publications and international reputation. For most of his career Simmel 
was dependent upon the fees paid by students who enrolled in his classes 
and a legacy left by the friend of the family who brought him up after the 
death of his parents. In 1886, while trying to recover money owed to his 
family, Simmel was shot and injured (Köhnke 1983). Fortunately, he 
recovered quickly. As his reputation grew in the 1890s and 1900s – George 
Santayana famously described Simmel as “the brightest man in Europe” 
(Levine et al 1976a:815) – a tenured post continued to elude him, despite 
obtaining the strong support of distinguished academics like Max Weber. 
When he did finally obtain a permanent full professorial post, it was at the 
border city of Strasbourg. Arriving there in 1914, Simmel was just in time to 
see normal academic activity curtailed by the outbreak of the First World 
War. 
Anti-Semitism was only part of the story. Controversy followed Simmel 
throughout his life. He was widely regarded as a brilliant philosopher and 
sociologist yet also seen as a maverick intellectual, the possessor of a mind 
that delved into a range of topics and areas that some felt too broad for the 
good of his academic career. After initial studies at Berlin University in the 
fields of history and folk psychology, he settled on philosophy, the discipline 
that provided an enduring identity for his intellectual interests. However, his 
academic path was not straightforward. In 1881 he was awarded a doctorate 
by Berlin University. His thesis on the psychological and ethnological origins 
of music was rejected as unsatisfactory but an earlier, prize-winning essay 
was allowed to stand in its place. In 1885 he was finally awarded the 
habilitation (the higher doctorate that is a prerequisite for university 
teaching in Germany). At the oral defence of his thesis Simmel responded to 
one of his examiners in a manner that was taken as offhand and sarcastic, 
and he was sent home for six months “to ponder how one behaves toward 
worthy older scholars” (Landmann 1958: 21). Throughout his career Simmel 
was not afraid to challenge conventional thinking wherever it was to be 
found. 
Simmel quickly established a reputation as a gifted lecturer at Berlin. 
He may have been a victim of the antisemitism infecting the German 
university system of his day and thus an outsider, but he enjoyed a wider 
intellectual impact than most tenured academics. As a “stranger in the 
academy” (Coser 1965) his marginal status perhaps aided the cultivation of 
his perceptive observations of social life.  His classes became attractions for 
the cultural elite of the city, as well as for large numbers of foreign and 
4 
 
women students, a following that did not endear Simmel to the state’s 
educational authorities. In addition, he was not a narrow specialist. 
Sociology was something of a mid-career interest for Simmel whose training 
was in neoKantian philosophy and whose sociology reflected the application 
of those philosophical interests to the understanding of social life. It was 
this mid-career interest that led to Simmel being regarded as a precursor to 
interactionism. 
Simmel as interactionist avant la lettre 
Simmel is not widely acknowledged as a key founder of interactionism. 
Usually, interactionism is portrayed as growing out of America’s only 
indigenous philosophical tradition, pragmatism, and is closely associated 
with sociologists and others working at the University of Chicago in the 
interwar years of the twentieth century. Histories of interactionism (e.g. 
Meltzer et al 1975; Reynolds 2003a; 2003b) often downplay Simmel’s 
contribution as peripheral or ignore it completely. The reasons for such 
neglect are worth exploring because they shed light not only on the 
achievements and limitations of Simmel’s sociology but also on the 
contested history of interactionism and ongoing debates about its meaning 
and scope. 
 One reason for that neglect is advanced in Paul Rock’s magisterial The 
Making of Symbolic Interactionism (1979). The interactionist tradition has 
been chronically forgetful of its past. For a long time it was something of an 
oral tradition transmitted through teachers at the University of Chicago. It 
was suspicious of grand theories, concentrating instead on empirical 
sociological studies. Rock’s book is one of the few histories to identify the 
pivotal role of Simmel in the rise of interactionism. Simmel was a significant 
part of the early curriculum at Chicago. At the heart of this contribution was 
the form-content distinction. Individuals were motivated to act through any 
number of purposes, drives, and desires unique to the psychology and 
biology of the individual. Sociology’s main business lay in identifying the 
forms assumed by human action and discovering their general features. 
Rock also examined pragmatism as the second key constituent of 
interactionism. Knowledge was regarded by pragmatists as embedded in the 
world, not separate from it: “acts themselves are problem-solving processes: 
they are always addressed to unsettled features of a world or self that 
require alteration” (Rock 1979:69). In Rock’s account formalism and 
pragmatism provide the twin foundations of interactionism. 
Simmel seems to have been an interactionist before symbolic 
interactionism had crystallised as such. The terms need distinguishing. 
Symbolic interactionism (SI) was devised by Herbert Blumer in a textbook 
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chapter published in 1937 and elaborated in his 1969 book bearing that 
title. Blumer was always clear that he was giving a name and trying to 
elucidate the general perspective that he associated with a group of 
American thinkers including George H. Mead, John Dewey, William I. 
Thomas, Robert E. Park, William James, Charles H. Cooley, Florian 
Znaniecki, James Mark Baldwin, Robert Redfield and Louis Wirth. Of these 
figures it was Mead and the social psychology he taught for three decades at 
the University of Chicago that was the outstanding influence on Blumer’s 
formulation. At the heart of symbolic interactionism were “three simple 
premises” (Blumer 1969a:1, 2): that people acted towards things in terms of 
their meanings, that these meanings arose in social interaction between 
people, and that meanings were interpreted by people in dealing with 
whatever they encounter in interaction. Blumer’s conception of SI brought to 
centre stage social psychological questions of meaning and interpretation. 
But as he recognized, the tradition was older than his term for it. It was a 
broader tradition too, not wholly captured by Blumer’s programmatic 
statements: Simmel, for one, was absent.  
Berenice Fisher and Anselm Strauss (1978) drew attention to the 
“Park-Thomas” strand in what they prefer to label simply as 
“interactionism”. The Park-Thomas strand underscored the fresh impetus 
Park gave to the Chicago School of sociology in its 1920s heyday, as well as 
the continuing impact of W. I. Thomas (who encouraged Park to come to 
Chicago in the first place) after Thomas’ own premature departure from the 
University of Chicago in 1918. For Fisher and Strauss (1978:458), 
interactionism at Chicago was a “dual tradition” with a social psychological 
line emanating from Mead and amplified by Blumer (i.e. SI) and a social 
organizational line deriving from Park and Thomas. “Interactionism”, then, 
is the more encompassing term, although matters are complicated by 
common usage and by the existence of a journal (Symbolic Interaction) and 
an organization (SSSI – Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction) that 
use the term SI to denote what Fisher and Strauss (and later Atkinson & 
Housley 2003) mean by “interactionism”. This chapter follows these 
distinctions, reserving the term “SI” for Blumer’s specific articulation. 
  How did Simmel’s sociology become well-known to those developing 
interactionism in the USA? It is clear that Simmel was an early and 
significant figure in shaping Chicago sociology, out of which interactionism 
would emerge. As noted, Albion Small, in his role as editor of the Chicago-
based American Journal of Sociology, published English translations of 
several of Simmel’s papers as he produced them (Frisby 1991 has a detailed 
tracking). After the First World War, Simmel’s work was primarily 
disseminated at Chicago by Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess. Park, 
6 
 
like Small and like Mead, undertook graduate education in Germany, then 
the world’s leading university system. As the key figure in the establishment 
of the “Chicago School” Park was central in mediating the significance of 
Simmel for its broad approach to the study of urban life. He later 
acknowledged that “listening to the lectures of Georg Simmel, at Berlin, I 
received my only formal [sic] instruction in sociology” (Park, 1950: vi). The 
famous textbook by Park and Burgess, Introduction to the Science of 
Sociology (1969; orig. 1921), nicknamed the “Green Bible”, gave considerable 
attention to formal sociology by including no fewer than ten extracts from 
Simmel -- more than from any other single author. Although the book 
reflected the catholic tastes of Park and Burgess, its framework was of a 
broadly formal character and, as Martindale (1961) observed, “when all is 
said and done, their hearts belonged to Simmel, for the central ideas of their 
sociological system were composed of processes, formally conceived” 
(Martindale 1961: 254; see also Matthews 1977:31, 41-50). 
The ethnographic tradition begun at Chicago by Park was carried 
forward by Everett C. Hughes (1897-1983), whose work on the sociology of 
occupations and whose teaching of field work methods (Junker 1960) 
powerfully influenced that eminent cohort of graduate students (including 
many future luminaries of the interactionist tradition) that trained at 
Chicago in the decade following the end of World War II (Fine 1995).  Closely 
conversant with German language and literature, Hughes was instrumental 
in advancing the understanding of Simmel’s sociology in his roles as 
translator (Simmel 1949; Goffman 1971: 97n.3) and as commentator 
(Hughes 1955, 1965). In the period following the end of World War II Hughes 
became the “senior American Simmel scholar” who found in Simmel an 
intellectual role model that he read “not for knowledge but for inspiration” 
(Jaworski 1997:22, 23). Louis Wirth and Edward Shils also promoted 
interest in Simmel’s work at Chicago in the 1930s and 1940s (Levine et al 
1976a: 819; Tomasi 1998). While Simmel’s influence on American sociology 
grew and diversified through the twentieth century (Levine et al. 1976a, 
1976b; Jaworski 1997) it remained from the first a key part of the 
intellectual milieu of Chicago’s famed sociology department. A recrudescence 
of interest in Simmel was evident in some of the work of the “Second 
Chicago School of Sociology” (Fine 1995), in particular that of Erving 
Goffman. 
Thus there seems to be a direct line of influence from Simmel through 
Park and Hughes to the Chicago tradition that formed the seedbed of the 
interactionist perspective. Simmel’s ideas were well known in Chicago circles 
from the turn of the century onwards. For example, George H. Mead was 
aware of Simmel’s distinctive approach. In a sympathetic review of Simmel’s 
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“discouragingly massive” 1900 volume, Philosophie des Geldes, Mead 
concluded that “in its aim it is sociological” (Mead 1901: 619). But it was the 
Simmel of the studies that were finally collected together in the 1908 volume 
Soziologie that formed the basis of his impact on interactionism. At the same 
time, it must be acknowledged that Simmel’s largest influence on American 
sociology was to open up fresh lines of conventional sociological enquiry in 
fields such as social distance, small groups, conflict and social exchange 
(see Levine et al. 1976a, 1976b). More recently Gary Jaworski (1997) 
suggested that Simmel’s impact American sociology was not only a matter of 
tracing influences and noting new fields. Focusing on the circumstances of 
production and the wider social and cultural contexts in which American 
sociology appropriated Simmel, Jaworski traced the intricate ways in which 
Simmel’s ideas and approaches served as sources of inspiration – not only 
for such key Chicago figures as Park, Hughes and Goffman, but also for 
major functionalist sociologists such as Merton and Parsons. 
Moreover, Simmel and Chicago is not the full story of his influence on 
interactionist sociology. The genealogy of interactionism is also complicated 
by the development of variant approaches outside of Chicago. In especial 
contrast to Blumerian symbolic interactionism, the Iowa School pioneered 
by Manford Kuhn placed greater store by empirically testable propositions, 
conventional scientific procedures, quantitative methods and the need to 
acknowledge the place of social structural conditions in interactional 
analysis (Meltzer et al 1975:55-67; Stryker 1980). Curiously, given that 
Simmel’s own methodological position was some way distant from such 
positivistic methods, the Iowa School seemed more sympathetic to 
acknowledging Simmel as a precursor. The attraction of Simmel for the Iowa 
School was that his forms of sociation offered a theory of social structure 
emergent out of the diversity of actual interaction that more clearly 
recognised the patterning of social life than the many “descriptive” 
qualitatively-based studies generated by Chicago School interactionism. 
Although a minority variant of interactionism, the Iowa School has persisted 
as a productive research tradition through the millennium (Katovich et al 
2003) 
Simmel never visited America. American scholars read his writings 
and some attended his lectures in Berlin as part of their graduate training. 
His influence was very much textually mediated. Had Simmel visited 
America, he might have been struck by the similarities between his home 
city and the city that Park took as a “natural laboratory” for the study of 
social life. Others did make the comparison. After visiting Germany in 
October 1891, Mark Twain declared that “Berlin is the European Chicago” 
(cited in Jazbinsek et al., 2001: 6). The populations of both cites grew at an 
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enormous rate in the nineteenth century, creating European and American 
versions of the modern metropolis with its attendant problems and 
possibilities. Located in Chicago, Park and his students could scarcely have 
been better placed to extend and develop Simmel’s insights about the 
distinctive outlook and mental set of the city-dweller sketched in 
“Metropolis” essay (Simmel 1950[1903]). 
What features of Simmel’s sociological thinking have been taken up by 
interactionism? To address this question remainder of this chapter will 
outline some aspects of formal sociology before reviewing the impact of 
Simmel on two leading interactionists, Herbert Blumer and Erving Goffman.  
Simmel’s Method and Analytic Attitude 
Simmel’s novel insight was to direct his analytical gaze to the sociological 
significance of ordinary experiences and everyday interaction, highlighting 
general features of their details in ways that qualify his sociology as a strong 
forerunner of symbolic interactionism. Simmel contended that while it is 
easy to think of “society” as a structure comprising the state and the family, 
work and political organizations, social classes, and so on, 
“…there exists an immeasurable number of less conspicuous 
forms of relationship and kinds of interaction. Taken singly, 
they appear negligible.  But since in actuality they are inserted 
into the comprehensive and, as it were, official social 
formations, they alone produce society as we know it” (Simmel, 
1950: 9) 
If, as social science had done up until that point, attention was only given to 
major social formations, then it would be “impossible piece together the real 
life of society as we encounter it in our experience” (Simmel, 1950: 9). 
Simmel then provided examples of the kinds of “interactions among the 
atoms of society” that his sociology was to address: 
“That people look at one another and are jealous of one another; 
that they exchange letters or dine together; that irrespective of 
all tangible interests they strike one another as pleasant or 
unpleasant; that gratitude for altruistic acts makes for 
inseparable union; that one asks another man after a certain 
street, and that people dress and adorn themselves for one 
another – the whole gamut of relations that play from one 
person to another and that may be momentary or permanent, 
conscious or unconscious, ephemeral or of grave consequence 
(and from which these illustrations are quite casually chosen), 
all these incessantly tie men together. Here are the interactions 
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among the atoms of society. They account for all the toughness 
and elasticity, all the color and consistency of social life, that is 
so striking and yet so mysterious.” (Simmel 1950: 10) 
These ordinary phenomena deserve analytic attention because they “exhibit 
society in statu nascendi” (Simmel 1959a:327) – society in the course of 
being produced and reproduced. 
Form and Content 
The scope and boundaries of sociology as it emerged in the second 
half of the nineteenth century were not certain. Simmel addressed this issue 
in the very first chapter of Soziologie in an essay refined over the previous 
decade and a half. He lamented the tendency to “dump” all the historical 
psychological and social sciences “into one great pot labelled ‘sociology’” 
(Simmel 1959a:311; see also Simmel 2009: 20). No new perspective could be 
produced by such a procedure, only a repackaging of what already existed. 
To escape this unproductive state of affairs Simmel felt it necessary to 
advance a clear conception of the social realm and distinctive notion of 
sociology’s method. Taking up his associational conception of society, 
Simmel proposed that sociology must develop as a special social science 
focused specifically on the social aspects of interactions between people. 
Since all science is based on abstracting certain elements of the totality from 
a particular viewpoint, sociology must likewise proceed. It addressed the 
interaction between individuals (“sociation”) from a particular viewpoint, 
distinguishing the “forms” from the “contents” of sociation. The forms so 
abstracted were “structures that exist and develop outside the individual” 
(1959a: 312). Yet they depended for their existence on the contents of 
sociation that reside in the psychological dispositions and biological 
conditions of the individual. Examples of contents included hunger, love and 
religiosity: they “are not social” in themselves. But they became factors in 
sociation when they engender interaction, when “they transform the mere 
aggregation of isolated individuals into specific forms of being with and for 
one another” (Simmel 1959a: 315). Examples of forms included “domination 
and subordination, competition, imitation, division of labor, factionalism, 
representation, the reciprocal nature of inclusion and exclusion” (Simmel 
2009: 24). The task of formal sociology was to apply the form-content 
distinction to instances of sociation and “systematically under a consistent 
scientific viewpoint” bring together descriptions of the forms of sociation. 
Only then would sociology cease to be a depository for all things social and 
emerge as a special social science with a distinctive approach to a 
demarcated sphere of social life, namely “what in ‘society’ really is society” 
Simmel 1959a: 320)iii. This special social science was likened by Simmel to 
geometry, which abstracted the spatial element from material 
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configurations. Formal sociology similarly abstracted the forms, the 
structures between individuals, from the diverse contents or energies that 
propel individuals into interactions with others.  
Simmel’s analysis of dyads and triads is a good example of formal 
sociology in practice. Simmel explored how a two-party relationship enjoys 
greater closeness than a three-party relationship: “A dyad depends on each 
of its two elements…for its life it needs both, but for its death, only one” 
(Simmel 1950: 124). A dyad only consists of two relations, A→B and B→A, 
and so “each of the two feels himself confronted only by the other, not by a 
collectivity above him” (123). But by adding a third party a “superpersonal 
life” emerges. Now there are six possible relations to consider (A→B; B→A; 
A→C; C→A; B→C; C→B). Two parties may act as a majority towards the 
third, as is often the case when parents act jointly towards their child. One 
party may feel excluded by the other two. Or one party may try to exploit 
differences between the other two (“divide and rule”). Some of these 
generalizations represent a formalization of everyday observations (“two’s 
company, three’s a crowd”; “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”). Simmel’s 
point is that the generalizations about dyads and triads apply irrespective of 
the content of particular relationship. They are equally applicable to treaties 
between nation states or relations between members of a family. They are 
generalizations about dyads and triads as forms of sociation.   
How is Society Possible? 
Simmel brought a distinctive approach to analysing “the interactions 
among the atoms of society”. At its simplest, it applied Immanuel Kant’s 
philosophical distinctions between form and content to the study of society. 
This strategy was explicit in “How is society possible?” (Simmel 1959b). The 
question was expressly modelled after Kant’s question, “How is nature 
possible?” Kant proposed that knowledge of nature was made possible by 
universal categories of mind (such as time, space and causality) that ordered 
our sense perceptions and thus made the natural world intelligible to us. In 
the case of society, no ordering outside agent was needed because society’s 
constituent units, interacting individuals, are themselves aware beings who 
are knowledgeable about their actions. Simmel continued with a bold 
attempt to identify three sociological apriorities, three very general 
presuppositions that he considered necessary to transform an aggregate of 
individuals into social beings capable of routinely producing and 
reproducing society through ordinary interaction. Simmel asked in effect, 
what makes intersubjective social relations possible? Given that there are 
individuals, what must be presupposed a priori for the individual to be a 
social being? I want to suggest that, read from an interactionist vantage, 
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Simmel’s apriorities present a set of paradoxes that lie at the heart of the 
interactionist analytic attitude. 
Three apriori (necessary) conditions are identified (Simmel appears to 
acknowledge there could be more). First of all, while we assume that others 
have a unique individuality, our knowledge of that individuality is derived 
from general categories through which we typify others as workers, family 
members and so on. Of course these general categories are imperfect 
representations of the other but by supplementing and transforming these 
“juxtaposed fragments” we are able to form a picture of “the completeness of 
an individuality” (Simmel 1959b:344). Paradoxically, it is through general 
categories that we can come to an appreciation of individuality.  
The second apriority Simmel asserts is that the individual is always 
something more than their relevant category and social role. Society, Simmel 
declares, is “a structure which consists of beings who stand inside and 
outside of it at the same time” (Simmel 1959b:347). From the point of view 
of individuals, society consists of beings who feel themselves to be “complete 
social entities” and “complete personal entities” (Simmel 1959b:351), each 
acting as a precondition of the other. Thus, a second paradox: social being 
depends on non-social being and vice versa. 
The third apriority involves adopting the analogy of society as an 
“ideal structure”, a kind of giant bureaucracy, composed of related positions 
that must be filled for the society to operate. Meanwhile the individual can 
be regarded as the bearer of needs and capacities that require to be 
expressed. How is some kind of harmony between society’s needs and the 
needs of the individual to be achieved? The solution, Simmel suggests, is 
provided by the notion of vocation. The individual takes up a vocation such 
as mother or manager “on the basis of an inner calling, a qualification felt to 
be intimately personal” (Simmel 1959b:354). In this way society’s need for 
positions to be filled is also met. The third paradox is that the individual’s 
innermost aspirations require something social for their realization. 
These three apriorities provided the necessary conditions for 
transforming an aggregate of individuals into social beings, whose reciprocal 
actions (sociation or interaction) made society possible. Simmel persistently 
addressed the properties individuals must bring to interaction – to 
categorize, to simultaneously sustain social and personal life, to enact a 
notion of vocation – as the basis of an answer to the question of how society 
was possible. The discussion throws into relief how Simmel used his studies 
of Kant to reap sociological dividends. Its novelty was as a solution to 
sociology’s fundamental theoretical problem – how social order is produced – 
that is addressed in terms of the capacities of individuals. The solution to 
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the problem of order contrasts with the solutions presented by figures as 
diverse as Marx, Durkheim and Parsons, who each answer by pointing to 
different features of how societies are organized as large-scale, durable 
structures. 
From the point of view of interactionism, Simmel’s apriorities 
anticipated core aspects of the perspective. Broadly, the first apriority 
underlined the importance of how the typifications associated with social 
identities are negotiated in different spheres of social life (interactionist 
examples might include: cab drivers and their fares; marks and their 
coolers; the status dilemmas of Black doctors in Southern states). The 
second expressed a conception of self that was social but never completely 
compliant to social demands because individuals possess their own personal 
interests, ambitions and desires (deviance disavowal; role distance; the 
identities sustained by the mental hospital’s underlife). The third apriority 
echoes interactionist and other sociological social psychologies’ claims that 
“role” is the key concept linking the “individual” and “society” (Gerth & Mills 
1954; Berger 1966).  The three apriorities might be read also as a 
counterpart that other famous list of three in SI – Blumer’s (1969a:2) “three 
simple premises”.  
Sociology of Knowledge 
The role of knowledge in social life was a theme of Simmel’s that 
directly connects to interactionist concerns. One example is Simmel’s (1950) 
discussion of the stranger, a social type who is a member of a society that 
they do not belong to initially. Traders are Simmel’s paradigm case (e.g. 
European Jews) The stranger differs from the wanderer who comes today 
and goes tomorrow– the stranger is here today and stays tomorrow. 
Distance and nearness characterize the stranger’s position, who is both 
inside and outside the group. The stranger enjoys a certain respect because 
of this marginal status e.g. is regarded as holding an objectivity that insiders 
lack; or the stranger may receive opinions expressed more openly than 
insiders would divulge to their “own”. The stranger benefits society by 
providing objectivity and embodying fresh perspectives that insiders may not 
otherwise access. 
The role of knowledge in social life was continued in Simmel’s 
discussion of secrecy. Simmel observed that the first thing we need to know 
in any interaction is who is it that we are dealing with?  In pursuing this 
basic question about identity Simmel distinguishes ‘acquaintances” – where 
we know about the “that” of another’s personality, not its “what” – from 
people we know more intimately. Discretion is important between 
acquaintances. It involves respecting whatever the acquaintance holds 
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secret but also “in staying away from the knowledge of all that the other 
does not expressly reveal to us” (Simmel 1950: 321). Thus a kind of “ideal 
sphere” surrounds every individual. Built into our notions of “honour” is the 
idea of not “coming too close” to the person. The everyday activities, 
personal characteristics and property of the person can be included in this 
not-to-be-invaded sphere. 
Simmel’s attention then turns to the role of the secret in social life. A 
secret involves “the hiding of realities by negative or positive means” (Simmel 
1950: 330). Secrecy generates a “second world” alongside the “manifest 
world” and is a form of sociation when persons are bound together by their 
secret knowledge. From a sociological point of view, Simmel reminds us, the 
secret is ethically neutral – admirable as well as reprehensible acts may be 
kept secret. The fascination of secrets for us lies in differences – as in the 
children’s brag, “I know something you don’t” – and a feeling of superiority 
(we think that what we are denied must have value). Secrecy generates a 
potential instability. The internal danger to secrecy is giving oneself away 
while the external threat to secrecy is betrayal. Tensions and power 
surround efforts at concealment as well as the revelation of a secret. Secrecy 
is a form, Simmel reminded us, which can include any content. What counts 
as a secret varies historically. For example, in Europe up to the 18th 
century, many states kept the size of their national debt a secret.  
The Search for Generic Properties 
Simmel’s interest in identifying the general features of forms and analyzing 
their properties was taken up by the interactionist studies of the second 
Chicago School, for example in the ways in which the concept of “career” 
was used as a formal concept to highlight the transitions from one status to 
another (see Atkinson & Housley [2003:89-116] for British examples).  
Simmel’s conception of the characteristics of these forms is more in 
keeping with currently influential versions of the structure-agency relation. 
Simmel’s forms are not like Platonic essences the suggestion that Simmel 
presents an arid and static image of social life is one of the commoner 
interpretive mistakes in the critical literature.  Schermer and Jary (2013) 
remind us that while form is a key organizing feature of Simmel’s approach, 
his sociological reasoning contained strong “dialectical” elements, evident in 
his characteristic explorations of the tensions and dualities in the forms he 
analyzed. Instructive here is Tenbruck’s (1959) careful analysis of the 
method of formal sociology and the notion of the “dignity” of the forms of 
sociation. By the “dignity” of forms Simmel meant first, that the forms 
persist irrespective of the particular individuals who enact them, who may 
come and go; second, that the generic characteristics of the form are 
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independent of their historical realization. Forms have an “objective 
structure” but not one that floats free of individuals’ orientations. They have 
“a dual character, at once superior to the actors and subject to them” 
(Tenbruck 1959:88).  
Some commentators beginning with Durkheim (1982[1903]) 
complained that Simmel’s sociology did not supply a method – a set of 
empirical procedures – for abstracting features of the forms of sociation. 
Simmel himself recognized the issue and encouraged cross-cultural and 
historical comparison to aid the process yet acknowledged that there was an 
irreducible intuitive element: 
“Nothing more can be attempted than the establishment of the 
beginning and the direction of an infinitely long road – the 
pretension to any systematic and definitive completeness would 
be, at the very least, illusory. Perfection can be obtained here by 
the individual student only in the subjective sense that he 
communicates everything he has been able to see”.  (Simmel 
1959a:336n.5; see also Simmel 2009:31-32n. for alternate 
translation). 
For Durkheim (1982[1903]:180-182)  the process whereby Simmel 
abstracted the forms did not rest upon any methodical, publically verifiable 
procedure but instead relied on the subjectivity, ingenuity and whimsy of 
Simmel himself – no basis at all for founding an empirical science. 
Interactionist research that follows Simmel’s lead has highlighted though 
not finally resolved the issue. It is evident, for example, in Eviatar 
Zerubavel’s (1980) conjecture, “If Simmel were a fieldworker”. (Responding to 
Zerubavel it is tempting to say, if he were, he would practise fieldwork like 
Erving Goffman). What Zerubavel calls for is the application of the formal 
approach to ethnographic fieldwork data. A formal approach would entail a 
shift from fact collection to analytical perspectives, seeking the abstraction 
of formal patterns not the reproduction of concrete contents. Overall the 
demand would be for analytical selectivity rather than comprehensive 
coverage of a research setting. But how would these principles be put into 
practice in actual studies? Opinion among interactionists has varied. Some, 
like Goffman (in Becker 2003) expressed scepticism about devising a robust 
set of rules of procedure. Others, including Becker, seem to suggest that 
some steps can be taken in the shape of analytic induction, or grounded 
theory, or analytic ethnography (Lofland 1995). These remain live questions 
for practising fieldworkers sympathetic to interactionism’s formal impulse 
towards the isolation of the generic properties of social processes. 
Simmel and Blumer 
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As noted, Blumer does not name Simmel in his account of SI’s origins. 
Nonetheless, a persuasive case for a detailed affinity between the 
fundamental assumptions of Simmel’s formal sociology and those of 
Blumer’s SI has been made by Jacqueline Low (2008). She identifies 
similarities in their ideas about social reality, the nature of the individual-
society relationship, and the nature of social action. Furthermore, in some of 
these areas, the affinities between Blumer’s views and Simmel’s are stronger 
than those between Blumer and his acknowledged key influence, Mead.  
Both Simmel and Blumer viewed society or social reality as 
constituted through individuals interacting with each other. For Simmel 
society was an “event” or occurrence where people mutually affected each 
other’s fate. For Blumer society was people in interaction fitting their lines of 
action to each other (Low 2008:328). Both Simmel and Blumer stressed the 
contextual determination of meaning whereas Mead placed emphasis on 
shared meanings in the interpretation of symbols. Simmel and Blumer also 
diverged from Mead in their image of social life: Mead tended to be “stuck in 
consensus” as Blumer put it in interview with Norbert Wiley in 1982 (Low 
2008:329) while Simmel and Blumer regarded conflict as an ineluctable 
feature of social life. 
Convergence between Simmel and Blumer and divergence from Mead 
was also evident in their characterizations of the relationship between the 
individual and society. Mead considered society temporally to precede the 
individual, pointing out that all individuals are born into ongoing societies. 
This ongoing social process was taken as a given. Simmel and Blumer in 
contrast maintain that structure was emergent from individual interaction 
and thus that structure had no temporal precedence over interaction. This 
position rejected a model where society was determinative of the individual’s 
actions, which Mead sometimes tended towards. The relationship of 
individual to social structure was seen as recursive by both Simmel and 
Blumer. Forms emergent in interaction can crystallize as something external 
and oppressive to individuals (elaborated in Simmel’s theory of the tragedy 
of culture). Blumer similarly emphasised the enabling and constraining 
aspects of social structures: situations were to be interpreted as “tasks, 
opportunities, obstacles, means, demands, discomforts, dangers, and the 
like” (Blumer 1969a:85). 
Low (2008) also proposed similarities in how Simmel and Blumer see 
the nature of social action as fundamentally interpretive in character, in 
contrast to Mead’s emphasis on its responsive character. Or, more correctly, 
Blumer stressed how interpretation intervenes between stimulus and 
response. This conception sits well with Simmel’s suggestion that 
individuals in interaction are able to “correlate” their existence intelligently 
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with the existence of other. If Low is less than persuasive here then that is 
perhaps because Simmel lacked the developed theory of language, 
symbolism and reflexivity that was pragmatism’s contribution to 
interactionist sociology. Nevertheless, the notion of the individual as an 
intelligent and knowledgeable agent was an abiding motif of Simmel’s 
approach. 
Blumer’s (1968; 1969b) analyses of fashion show that he did not 
entirely overlook the ideas of Simmel. Blumer accepted Simmel’s (1957) 
contentions that fashion was a social form and a general process that goes 
far beyond stylistic changes in clothing and adornment. There can be 
fashions in architecture, interior design, even medicine and scientific theory.  
In Blumer’s (1968: 341-342) words, fashion is a "continuing pattern of 
change in which certain social forms enjoy temporary acceptance and 
respectability only to be replaced by others more abreast of the times". 
Building on observations made in his 1932 study of Paris fashion houses 
(Davis 1991:18n.1) Blumer’s takes issue with Simmel’s (1957[1904]) 
examination of fashion, which he sees as a version of “trickle down” theory. 
Fashion is a device whereby people occupying the higher strata of society 
can distinguish themselves from those in neighbouring social classes who 
seek to emulate their social superiors. When members of subjacent social 
classes adopt the fashion, it is abandoned by those higher up. Blumer 
accepted the possibility of class emulation but argues that it alone is 
insufficient to define the “fashion mechanism” as such. Instead of class 
differentiation Blumer proposed a theory of “collective selection”. Designers, 
fashion house directors and buyers interact to interpret the current 
“collective tastes”. These collective tastes develop among "people thrown into 
areas of common interaction and having similar runs of experience" (Blumer 
1969:284). A process of collective selection then translated these tastes into 
fashionable styles. In Blumer’s theory, processes internal to the fashion 
mechanism come first. The opportunity to use fashion as a marker of 
distinction was secondary to these processes.  
While Blumer’s critique of trickle-down theory and recommendation to 
study processes of collective selection served to stimulate investigation of 
range of fashion processes, using ethnographic and interactionist 
approaches (Davis 1992; Rubinstein 1995), Blumer’s analysis represents 
only a partial and simplified reading of Simmel’s original essay. As Davis 
(1991) reminds us, Simmel was also fascinated by fashion from the point of 
view of the fashionable individual, who in dressing fashionably could 
simultaneously feel special, individuated, set apart from the crowd yet also 
be recognized as fashionable by other fashionistas. The idea was crystallized 
by anthropologist Edward Sapir: “fashion is custom in the disguise of 
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departure from custom” (Sapir, cited in Davis 1991:7).  Schermer and Jary 
(2013) also emphasize the multifaceted and dialectical character of Simmel’s 
formulation that allows for much more complex patterns of emulation and 
innovation than Blumer’s simple top-down interpretation. Thus, when 
Blumer came to use Simmel, he did so in a manner that extracted a few 
sociological ideas stripped out of the philosophical context that lent those 
ideas sophistication and subtlety.  
Simmel and Goffman 
There is debate about whether Goffman was a symbolic interactionist. 
Trained at the University of Chicago in the classic years of the post-war 
second Chicago School, Goffman is frequently associated with symbolic 
interactionism. In an interview with Jef Verhoeven in 1980, Goffman stated 
that he found Blumer’s writings “very congenial”, agreeing that he adopted 
the “general Meadian framework that everybody of that period employed” 
(Verhoeven 2000:214; see also Helle 1998) and that Blumer’s notion of 
symbolic interaction was an acceptable, if rather abstract and broad 
approach to social action. The problem for Goffman was that the label 
symbolic interactionism “doesn’t signify too much”: it did not provide the 
guide to structural or organizational issues required by the next stage of 
sociological inquiry (Verhoeven 2000:214). For that next stage guidance 
Goffman claimed that he found Hughes, or British anthropologist A.R. 
Radcliffe-Brown, to be more useful sources. There seems to have been some 
tension or at least distance between Blumer and Goffman originating in 
Goffman’s student days, when he audited Blumer’s class but did not 
complete the course credits (Smith & Winkin 2012). For his part Blumer 
brought Goffman to his first teaching job at the University of California at 
Berkeley in 1958. Later, Blumer (1972) wrote a critical review in which he 
suggested that Goffman’s conception of human action was partial. All this 
suggests that Goffman was an interactionist though not in any strong sense 
a follower of Blumer’s conception of symbolic interactionism. 
The work of Erving Goffman presents the clearest example of Simmel’s 
influence on interactionist sociology. Paul Rock once observed that “Erving 
Goffman may become the unacknowledged reincarnation of Georg Simmel” 
(1979:27). Certainly, Goffman took much from Simmel’s formal sociology. He 
used it to legitimate his own inquiries, stating in his first book, The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, that “the justification for this approach 
(as I take to be the justification for Simmel’s also) is that the illustrations fit 
together into a coherent framework that ties together bits of experience the 
read has already had and provides the student with a guide worth testing in 
case-studies of institutional social life” (1959:xii). Goffman adapted a 
Simmelian formal approach to uncover a multitude of forms of face-to-face 
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interaction. In some instances Goffman directly developed Simmel’s ideas 
(for example: on personal space, on sociability, on the role of information in 
social life, on the adventure).  
There are a number of similarities and complementarities between 
Simmel and Goffman (Smith (2000[1989]). Goffman shared with Simmel a 
conception of society as interaction and saw the identification of forms of 
social life and the description of their properties as sociology’s primary task. 
Goffman concurred with Simmel’s view that interaction was an emergent 
product of the activities of individuals. There was a strong formal impulse 
throughout Goffman’s work, notably in Stigma where he drew upon a wide 
range of studies from several fields of enquiry in order to identify the 
“commonalities” of the situation of those “disqualified from full social 
acceptance” (Goffman 1963:147, Preface) 
While Goffman followed in Simmel’s footsteps, his sociology of the 
interaction order (Goffman 1983) refined formal sociology in novel ways. The 
interaction order was sui generis (Rawls 1987) and its properties could be 
empirically investigated.  Donald Levine disputed the claim that Goffman’s 
idea was new: “it was on the assumption of a sui generis interaction order 
that Simmel grounded his entire sociological program” (Levine 1989:114). 
Certainly, as the earlier discussion of the “dignity” of social forms (Tenbruck 
1959) suggested, both Simmel and Goffman considered interaction as 
emergent from the activities of individuals. But Goffman took a further step 
beyond Simmel in his dissertation by considering interaction as a species of 
social order. As a type of social order, Goffman claimed that the 
communicative conduct out of which interaction was wrought was a matter 
of rules, expectations, moments where no rules seem to apply, ways of 
dealing with the breaking of rules, ways of exploiting the rules for private 
ends, and the like (detailed in Smith 2006:25-27). In this way Goffman’s 
sociology must be seen as a real development of Simmel’s approach since it 
examined the actual practices involved in sustaining a definition of the 
situation and through which interaction might succeed or fail (and thus 
require remedial work). Goffman also progressed formal sociology by 
constructing his analyses as explicit conceptual frameworks, a feature 
offering greater analytic coherence than Simmel’s essayistic and dialectical 
approach since it more readily permitted empirical application and 
conceptual development. 
 If Smith’s (2000[1989]) discussion was mainly driven by an attempt to 
explore the similarities and echoes between the sociologies of Simmel and 
Goffman, Murray S. Davis (1997) offered a portrayal of their relationship 
designed to highlight the different paths taken by the two. Davis maintains 
that the work of both Simmel and Goffman served to legitimate the study of 
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human experience and thus to give human beings “more ontological weight” 
(1997:386; Davis’s italics). They dealt with human experience through a 
qualitative, inductive methodology, building their general notions from 
inspection of the details of social life and the historical record. For Simmel, 
interaction is a broad motif of his philosophical outlook – there is interaction 
evident between individuals, the topic of his formal sociology, but more 
broadly everything in the world interacts with everything else, a theme 
explored in his valedictory View of Life (Simmel 2011). For Goffman 
interaction was only of interest as the topic of his studies of the interaction 
order. Their views of the individual were similarly contrasting. Simmel 
wanted to exalt the individual, to signpost the powers and potentialities of 
the human being who was a social being but much else besides. Goffman in 
contrast wanted to sociologize the individual and eradicate the personal self 
by uncovering new social determinants originating from the demands of the 
interaction order. Simmel appealed to poetic and religious temperaments – 
Goffman to comics and cynics. 
The intriguing question for Goffman’s admirers and followers (just as 
it was for Simmel’s) is how can the sociology be taken forward? For some 
(e.g. Smith 2006:125-29) Goffman’s ideas already have a considerable 
afterlife, evident in the many studies of stigma, self-presentation, total 
institutions, civil inattention, face-work and footing that have extended and 
qualified Goffman’s original formulations. In addition to the scholarly 
contribution there is the “Goffman for everyone” (Winkin & Leeds-Hurwitz 
2013:129) – the writer who offers a straightforward but sophisticated toolbox 
for making sense of the particulars of our everyday lives. Clearly, Goffman 
remains an enduringly interesting and troubling figure who can be read in 




This chapter has explored some of the ways in which Simmel can be 
regarded as a proto-interactionist. The Simmelian influence on the 
development of interactionist sociology can be traced through its early 
impact on Chicago sociology. Simmel placed an interactionist conception of 
society at the centre of the special social science, formal sociology, which 
was devoted to uncovering the generic and potentially universal 
characteristics of interaction between individuals. In terms of topic matter, 
method and aims, there are clear anticipations of and convergences between 
Simmel’s sociology of the shape and substance of later interactionist 
analyses. The convergences become particularly conspicuous in aspects of 
Blumer’s and Goffman’s approaches. While Simmel could analyse delicate 
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features of social life, including topics such as intimacy, faithfulness and 
gratitude, his view of social life was robust and clear-sighted. Conflict, 
exchange, and relations of domination and subordination were central to 
Simmel’s sociological vision. He established the centrality of these 
phenomena for the interactionist tradition and showed how they worked out 
at the level of everyday interaction. 
 The Simmel that has made greatest impact on the subsequent 
development of interactionism is the earliest Simmel known to the English-
speaking world, the formal sociologist. In recent decades, however, 
translations have made the cultural Simmel more widely known. These 
writings show that Simmel was much more than sociological microscopist. 
Simmel’s (1978[1900]; 1997) writings on money and on the “tragedy of 
culture” reveal a recognition of how large-scale institutional change impacts 
on everyday interaction. Simmel focused upon the specific modes of 
experience and consciousness characteristic of modernity. Simmel’s 
(1978[1900]) novel claim was that modernity’s origins were to be found in 
the advent of a fully monetarized economy –  a claim running against the 
traditional society/industrial capitalism distinction seen as pivotal for so 
many thinkers, including Marx, Weber and Durkheim. Money, as a highly 
flexible form of exchange, can be divided in any number of ways, put to any 
number of purposes. Money, then, is pure instrumentality, completely 
subservient to the ends to which it is put. Anticipating some of Weber’s 
arguments about rationalization, Simmel proposed that money as an 
institutionalized feature of economic exchange breeds a rational, calculating 
outlook influencing many other spheres of life. These writings point to 
potentially productive directions for interactionist analyses of contemporary 
cultural phenomena. The cultural Simmel is fully consistent with the formal 
Simmel, which sought the universal properties of forms of sociation yet 
which works as a method that respects particularities and actual contexts in 
a manner congruent with interactionist sensibilities. Simmel (1978:55) 
ultimately wanted to find “in each of life’s details the totality of its meaning”. 
His formal sociology and what has been called his “cultural phenomenology” 
(Goodstein 2002) complemented each other. 
In a famous late statement Simmel envisaged that his intellectual 
legacy would be distributed like cash, to be used by the inheritors as they 
saw fit. In a kindred vein Fisher and Strauss (1978:458) suggested that the 
interactionist tradition might be “regarded less as a royal inheritance passed 
down through the generations than as a long-lived auction house” whose 
continuity depends more on the attractiveness of its offerings than its 
history. The complexity of Simmel’s intellectual heritage is such that his 
work continues to repay reading by interactionists concerned with the 
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relationships of interaction and structure as well as communication, culture 
and identity.  Thus, to borrow a phrase from Horst Jürgen Helle (2013), 
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helped to improve an earlier version of this chapter.     
ii Simmel also used the term Wechselwirkung (“reciprocal effect”) to describe aspects of more 
fleeting kinds of interaction. This chapter follows Wolff (1950: lxiii) and Schermer and Jary 
(2013:17-18) in using sociation to cover both German terms. 
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